When a catastrophic truck crash happens, the legal focus often starts with the driver and the motor carrier. But in modern freight transportation, the carrier is often only one piece of the chain. Many shipments are arranged by transportation brokers—companies that connect shippers with trucking companies and decide which carrier will move the load.
Today, the United States Supreme Court made clear that those broker-selection decisions can matter in state tort law.
In Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, the Court unanimously held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act—commonly called the FAAAA—does not preempt state-law negligent-hiring claims against transportation brokers when those claims fall within the Act's safety exception. The Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and held that a claim alleging negligent selection of an unsafe motor carrier is saved from preemption because it concerns motor-vehicle safety.
For truck accident lawyers, this is a landmark decision. It does not mean brokers are automatically liable whenever a carrier causes a crash. But it does mean that brokers cannot categorically avoid negligent-hiring claims by invoking FAAAA preemption when the claim is grounded in roadway safety.
The FAAAA in Plain English
The FAAAA is a federal statute designed to prevent states from economically regulating the trucking industry in ways that interfere with market competition. Its preemption clause bars states from enforcing laws "related to a price, route, or service" of a motor carrier or broker with respect to transportation of property.
That sounds broad because it is broad. Congress wanted to stop states from using their own regulatory regimes to control how freight companies price, route, or provide transportation services. In ordinary terms, the statute tells states: do not regulate the business model of interstate freight transportation through state-by-state economic rules.
But Congress also included an important carveout: the FAAAA does not restrict "the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles." That carveout is known as the safety exception. It reflects a basic distinction: Congress deregulated the economics of trucking, not the safety of trucks operating on public highways.
What Happened in Montgomery
Shawn Montgomery suffered severe and permanent injuries after his tractor-trailer, stopped on the side of the road in Illinois, was struck by a truck driven by Yosniel Varela-Mojena. Varela-Mojena was driving for Caribe Transport II, LLC, a motor carrier. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., a transportation broker, coordinated the shipment.
Montgomery sued the driver, the motor carrier, C.H. Robinson, and related entities. As to C.H. Robinson, Montgomery alleged negligent hiring. Specifically, Montgomery claimed that C.H. Robinson knew or should have known from Caribe Transport's safety rating that hiring it to transport goods was reasonably likely to result in crashes that would injure others.
The District Court held that the FAAAA preempted Montgomery's negligent-hiring claim against C.H. Robinson and that the claim did not fall within the safety exception. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the safety exception permits negligent-hiring claims against brokers that coordinate shipments in the transportation industry.
The Court's Core Reasoning: "With Respect To" Means "Concerns"
Justice Barrett, writing for a unanimous Court, framed the issue narrowly and carefully. The Court did not decide whether the FAAAA's general preemption clause would otherwise preempt Montgomery's negligent-hiring claim. Instead, the Court assumed for purposes of decision that preemption might apply, then held that the safety exception saved the claim.
The key statutory phrase was "with respect to motor vehicles." C.H. Robinson argued that negligent-hiring claims against brokers were too far removed from motor vehicles because brokers do not own the trucks, lease the trucks, employ the drivers, or physically operate the vehicles. The Supreme Court rejected that narrow reading.
The Court looked to ordinary meaning. Because the FAAAA does not define "with respect to," the Court treated the phrase as meaning "concerning" or "regarding." A claim is therefore "with respect to motor vehicles" if it concerns the vehicles used in transportation.
That interpretation was decisive. Montgomery alleged that C.H. Robinson failed to exercise reasonable care when it selected a carrier with a subpar safety rating to transport goods by truck. According to the Court, requiring a broker to use ordinary care in selecting a carrier "concerns" motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods.
That is the important move that unlocks broker liability. The broker's conduct is not treated as an abstract commercial decision disconnected from roadway safety. When the broker selects a motor carrier to move freight by truck, and the allegation is that the broker negligently selected an unsafe carrier, the claim is sufficiently connected to motor vehicles to fall within the safety exception.
Why the Safety Exception Does Not Swallow the Rule
The Court also addressed a major defense argument: if negligent-hiring claims fit within the safety exception, does the exception swallow FAAAA preemption entirely? The Court said no.
The safety exception saves only a subset of claims: those involving regulations or common-law duties concerning motor-vehicle safety. State laws about prices, routes, or services that have no relationship to safety remain preempted. That distinction matters. The decision does not give states unlimited power to regulate brokers. It preserves state tort claims when the duty at issue is tied to public safety on the highways.
The Circuit Split Is Now Resolved
Before Montgomery, federal courts were divided. The Seventh Circuit in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc. and the Eleventh Circuit in Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger had taken the broker-friendly view. The Ninth Circuit in Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. and the Sixth Circuit in Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc. had taken the opposite view. The Supreme Court expressly identified that split and resolved it.
That gives the decision special practical force. This is no longer a regional doctrine that depends on where the crash occurred or where the case was filed. The Supreme Court has now supplied the controlling federal preemption rule.
Practical Impact for Plaintiffs
For plaintiffs, Montgomery changes the litigation landscape in broker-involved truck crash cases. The decision does not prove negligent hiring. It does not establish breach, causation, or damages. It does not eliminate state-law defenses. But it removes a powerful threshold argument that brokers have used to get negligent-selection claims dismissed before discovery.
Going forward, plaintiffs can more confidently plead and pursue broker negligent-hiring claims where the facts support them. The critical question will be whether the broker knew or should have known that the selected carrier posed an unreasonable safety risk. That will put renewed focus on evidence such as:
- Carrier safety ratings and FMCSA data
- Out-of-service history and crash history
- Driver-qualification concerns and hours-of-service problems
- Maintenance and inspection deficiencies
- Broker onboarding policies and internal carrier-vetting standards
- Communications about the carrier and whether the broker ignored safety red flags before assigning the load
In other words, the fight shifts from "Is this claim preempted?" to "Did the broker act reasonably when it selected this carrier?"
Practical Impact for Brokers
For brokers, the decision is equally important. Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, wrote separately to emphasize that the case was closer than the Court's opinion might suggest. His concurrence acknowledged the brokers' concerns about litigation costs, insurance costs, and uncertainty in state tort litigation. But he ultimately agreed that federal law does not categorically preempt state tort liability against brokers for negligent selection of trucking companies.
At the same time, Justice Kavanaugh made an important point for future defense strategy: brokers should not routinely face liability simply because a crash occurred. He noted that brokers should be able to defend negligent-selection claims when they acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable motor carriers. He also pointed to proximate cause as a traditional state-law safeguard against excessive liability.
That concurrence gives brokers a roadmap. The defense will no longer be only, "The FAAAA bars the claim." Instead, the defense will often be, "We exercised reasonable care." A broker that wants to make that defense credible will need documentation—what it knew at the time of selection, what safety information it reviewed, what standards it applied, and why the chosen carrier was reasonably safe for the shipment.
Why This Is a Landmark Moment
Montgomery is significant because it recognizes the reality of modern freight transportation. Brokers are not passive bystanders. They are often the entities that select which motor carrier will move the load. When that selection allegedly places an unsafe carrier on the highway, state tort law may ask whether the broker used reasonable care.
The Court's decision is also significant because it respects the structure of the FAAAA. Congress sought economic deregulation, not a safety vacuum. As Justice Kavanaugh put it, it would be difficult to read an economic-deregulation statute as allowing tort suits against negligent trucking companies while categorically preempting suits against upstream brokers who negligently select unsafe trucking companies.
For law students studying preemption, Montgomery is a clean example of statutory interpretation doing real work. The outcome turned on text, structure, ordinary meaning, and the boundary between economic regulation and safety regulation. The phrase "with respect to motor vehicles" was not treated as a technical incantation. It was read in context.
For truck accident attorneys, the decision reshapes case strategy. Broker liability will now depend less on abstract preemption doctrine and more on the facts: what the broker knew, what it should have known, what it did to evaluate safety, and whether its selection decision contributed to the crash.
The next generation of trucking litigation will not end with the driver and the carrier. After Montgomery, lawyers must examine the entire freight chain—including the broker whose decision helped put the truck on the road.